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Note
Evaluating the Constitutionality of Marital Status
Classifications in the Regulation of Posthumous
Reproduction and Postmortem Sperm Retrieval
ALISON JANE WALKER
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court held that a state law
prohibiting the provision of contraceptives to unmarried persons
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s rational basis test because of the
disparate treatment it afforded to married and unmarried individuals.
Eisenstadt stands for an individual’s right to make their own procreative
decisions, free from governmental intrusions which impose arbitrary
classifications on privacy and freedom. This Note focuses on posthumous
reproduction and, more specifically, postmortem sperm retrieval: the
process of using a deceased male’s frozen sperm after his death
to produce his biological children at the request of his spouse or
intimate partner. It provides a survey of judicial decisions relating to
assisted reproductive technology, posthumous reproduction, and
the constitutional right to privacy as it relates to procreative
decision-making, as well as model statutes, state laws, and institutional
guidelines that seek to regulate posthumous reproduction.
Ultimately, this Note argues that judicial decisions, legislation, and
medical facility regulations or policies that prohibit unmarried partners
from posthumously reproducing with their deceased partner’s gametes on
the basis of their marital status are unconstitutionally discriminatory.
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Evaluating the Constitutionality of Marital Status
Classifications in the Regulation of Posthumous
Reproduction and Postmortem Sperm Retrieval
ALISON JANE WALKER *
INTRODUCTION
The concept of “family” is continually evolving as society, legislators,
and the judiciary reckon with near-constant developments in Assisted
Reproductive Technology (ART) that raise increasingly complex legal and
ethical questions. One such development is posthumous reproduction:
conceiving a child using gametes from a deceased individual.1 Posthumous
reproduction can occur using gametes from a deceased male or female.2
However, this Note will primarily focus on posthumous reproduction using
a deceased male’s gametes. This is accomplished by insemination with
frozen sperm stored prior to one’s death or with frozen sperm gathered
through postmortem sperm retrieval (PMSR), a medical procedure by which
a male’s sperm is removed shortly after death.3 Use of one’s sperm for
posthumous reproduction is either requested by the deceased prior to his
death and typically supported by a deposit of his sperm into a sperm bank,4
*
JD Candidate at the University of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to extend a very sincere
thank you to Professor Susan Schmeiser for her guidance and advice during the drafting of this Note. I
would also like to thank my fellow members of the Connecticut Law Review for their hard work and
thoughtful feedback. Most importantly, I would like to thank the people without whom I could not have
written a Note, made it through law school, or become the person I am today. Mom and Dad: Thank you
for encouraging me to challenge myself, for believing in me, and for reading this Note, and everything
else I’ve written, all the way through. Jake: Thank you for making me smile every day and for listening
to me stress about writing this when you didn’t even know what a Law Review was. Liv: Thank you for
enduring these three years with me, and for being my greatest ally in law school—proving that Westover
really is forevermore. Emma: Thank you for always texting back in girls club, no matter how ridiculous
my questions are, and for motivating me to push myself so I can keep up with you.
1
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 579,
579 (2005).
2
Id. at 580.
3
Andrew R. Zinkel et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval in the Emergency Department: A Case
Report and Review of Available Guidelines, 3 CLINICAL PRAC. & CASES EMERGENCY MED. 405, 405
(2019).
4
See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that posthumously
conceived children were entitled to insurance benefits based on the deceased father’s earnings where he
had requested his wife use sperm he had frozen prior to his death from terminal cancer to conceive after
his death), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 545 (2012); Hall v. Fertility Inst.
of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1349, 1351 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the deceased’s premortem
donation of his frozen sperm to his romantic partner for use in her own insemination following his death
did not violate public policy, if found to be a valid donation).

802

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:3

or, in many cases, requested by his spouse, partner, or family members after
he is declared legally dead.5
The question of whether posthumous reproduction using a deceased
male’s sperm should take place is only the beginning. The aftermath of
posthumous reproduction and PMSR opens a Pandora’s box of ethical and
legal considerations. Now that the sperm has been made available, what
happens next? The use of the deceased’s sperm, the legal status of children
resulting from that sperm, and the effect that the wishes of the deceased and
his survivors have on those determinations are all up for debate. But, because
there is no federal regulation6 to govern when, under what circumstances,
and at whose request posthumous reproduction or PMSR is appropriate,
some states have enacted statutes addressing the issue,7 and some courts
have decided posthumous reproduction disputes as cases of first
impression.8 This Note focuses on one commonality among the initial efforts
to regulate in states across the country: marriage as a prerequisite for
individuals to posthumously reproduce with the assurance that any resulting
child will have the same legal status as a child conceived prior to death.
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of the ethical questions that
arise when an individual seeks to posthumously reproduce. The numerosity
and complexity of these questions may explain why the present regulatory
framework addressing posthumous reproduction and PMSR is sparse and
inconsistent across the United States. Next, Part II presents a survey of the
regulatory frameworks governing posthumous reproduction and PMSR in
the states that have addressed it through statutes or judicial decisions thus
far. The existing framework demonstrates that the legal rights of the
deceased, of the individuals who wish to use their deceased partner’s sperm,
and of the children resulting from posthumous reproduction often largely
depend on whether the deceased was married. Courts, statutes, and

5
Requests for PMSR by the deceased’s partner or family are becoming so commonplace that
hospitals have begun instituting policies to govern decisions related to the procedure. See, e.g.,
Postmortem Sperm Retrieval (PMSR), WEILL CORNELL MED., https://urology.weillcornell.org/Postmor
tem-Sperm-Retrieval (last visited Dec. 29, 2021) (outlining the considerations made and requirements
that must be met by the requesting party for the facility to perform PMSR).
6
See, e.g., id. (“Currently, as there are no national regulations or restrictions related to postmortem
sperm retrieval, it is recommended that regulations are implemented at the local or institutional level
prior to the need arising for discussions with patients or families around this medical procedure.”); Emma
Grillo, The Complex Ethics of Saving a Dead Person’s Sperm, VICE (May 31, 2019, 4:00 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/7xgeyb/the-complex-ethics-of-saving-a-dead-persons-sperm (stating
that, unlike in other countries, the United States has “no national regulations” pertaining to PMSR).
7
The following state statutes are just some of those which address the parentage and status of
posthumously conceived children: ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106
(2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (West 2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-907 (2003).
8
See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
use of a deceased man’s frozen sperm to reproduce is not contrary to public policy).
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institutional guidelines alike tend to infer the deceased’s consent primarily
from the fact of a marriage between the deceased and the requesting party.
Part III of this Note examines the merits of this framework under the
lens of American constitutional jurisprudence on the right to privacy in
procreation and procreative decision-making. This Note focuses specifically
on Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the Supreme Court held that a law
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons failed the
Fourteenth Amendment’s rational basis test because of the distinction it
made between married and unmarried individuals.9 Famously, Eisenstadt
stands for the principle that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”10
Finally, Part IV of this Note makes recommendations as to how
legislators and the courts can better balance the interests at stake in disputes
arising out of posthumous reproduction and PMSR. Public policy interests,
including respecting the wishes of the dead and establishing the rights of
posthumously conceived children, should be weighed against individual
interests, including preserving autonomy in reproductive decision-making
and protecting privacy in intimate relationships. These recommendations are
geared toward creating a regulatory framework of posthumous reproduction
and PMSR that coexists with modern conceptions of “partners” and “family”
and resists making determinations based solely, or largely, on marital status.
I. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION AND PMSR
In the United States, the structure and formation of family is a
contentious subject because it is inextricable from various moral, sexual,
religious, political, and cultural associations. Family and procreation are so
often defined in the negative—by what they are not. Again and again,
Americans have drawn lines in the sand indicating what the proper moral
and legal limits are when it comes to sexuality, reproduction, and family
formation, just to move the lines further later on.11 ART is one factor that
plays into this pattern. As ART advances, new and varied forms of
reproduction come into conflict with traditional notions of parenting and
family. One such advancement, and the focus of this Note, is posthumous
reproduction. Although the ethical implications of posthumous reproduction
are not the primary concern of this Note, they cannot be separated from the
legal, constitutional, and regulatory considerations involved.
9

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972).
Id. at 453.
11
See discussion infra Part III (tracing the development of the right to privacy in procreation and
procreative decision-making in American constitutional jurisprudence).
10
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A discussion of the ethical implications of any ART procedure or
process must necessarily start with the United States’ legal and societal
mandate to protect individuals’ privacy and liberty when it comes to
reproduction and reproductive decision-making.12 While reproductive issues
are often highly politicized and extremely contested, the majority of
Americans believe that reproduction is a personal choice that should be
respected.13 However, “reproductive freedom” and “procreative liberty” do
not have concise, agreed-upon definitions. Most may interpret these terms
to mean that it is an individual’s right to choose to pursue or to avoid
procreation, but is that all? The scope of the right to reproduce becomes less
clear as reproduction departs from its simplest, most traditional context: a
married couple engaging in family planning and conceiving through
intercourse. When procreation occurs via ART, the same privacy and liberty
interests that support the right to reproduce are implicated, but new ethical
and legal questions necessarily arise that can affect how we view the
importance of protecting those interests.
In many cases, posthumous reproduction does not require technology or
expertise that substantially differs from that of a typical in vitro fertilization
or artificial insemination procedure.14 But, ethical and legal conflicts are
more likely to arise in this context than in a similar, “typical” procedure
because a state, medical facility, family member, or other party may question
whether it is right to conceive a child where one parent is already deceased.15
Because Americans hold procreative liberty and autonomy in such high
esteem, the first question we must ask is whether an individual maintains an
interest in that liberty and autonomy after death. Some may answer that
question in the affirmative because they feel there is a societal and moral
imperative to respect both the wishes of the deceased individual and the
finality of death as a concept.16 Others may answer in the negative,
expressing the belief, with which this Note agrees, that reproduction is an
experience for the living. We value reproduction because of the experiences
that result from it including conception, gestation, birth, and parenting. A
12

Id.
New Poll from the Center for Reproductive Rights: 6 in 10 Americans Support Federal Law to
Protect Abortion Access, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://reproductiverights.org/newpoll-from-the-center-for-reproductive-rights-6-in-10-americans-support-federal-law-to-protectabortion-access/.
14
See Raymond C. O’Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 332, 333–34 (2009) (describing the differences between posthumous
reproduction and established conception).
15
See generally Shelly Simana, Creating Life After Death: Should Posthumous Reproduction be
Legally Permissible Without the Deceased’s Prior Consent?, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIS. 329, 330 (2018)
(exploring the legal and ethical issues that posthumous reproduction presents in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Israel).
16
See Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and Utilizing
Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 301 (stating that “the importance of
the decision to reproduce is of such moment and has such a deeply personal nature that procreative
autonomy survives death”).
13
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deceased individual will not experience the conception of a posthumously
conceived child. A deceased individual does not gestate, does not give birth,
and does not parent. One could even go so far as to argue that no unwanted
reproduction can occur posthumously because a deceased individual cannot
experience the anxiety or fear that comes with the desire to avoid
parenthood. This does not mean that we should dismiss the wishes of the
deceased in situations where they have indicated whether they wish to have
posthumous children or whether they wish to procreate in general. A living
individual’s desire to procreate and to choose with whom to procreate does
not outweigh a deceased individual’s desire not to procreate.
This Note agrees that reproduction is primarily an experience for the
living and that, in some contexts, namely where the deceased has not expressly
objected, it is appropriate for a living individual to decide to posthumously
reproduce using a deceased individual’s gametes. However, it does not
support posthumous reproduction becoming an equal opportunity option
for all grieving individuals. One class of individuals that may seek
posthumous reproduction consists of those who use their deceased child’s
gametes and donor gametes to posthumously conceive their own grandchild.17
Justifications for allowing these individuals to become posthumous
grandparents include allowing them to “realiz[e] their child’s interest
in genetic continuity,” realize their “own interest[] in the continuation of
the family genetic heritage,” and participate in “the grand-parenting
experience.”18 Arguments against postmortem grandparenthood include that
“allowing . . . parents to use their child’s gametes and raise the resulting child
may blur the boundaries between parents and grandparents” and that “the
deceased’s parents will raise th[e] child as if he or she were their own,”
essentially treating the child as a “living monument” to the deceased,19 which
could harm the child’s self-worth, independence, and mental health. The
Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) strongly advises against allowing individuals to become posthumous
grandparents.20 This Note agrees that posthumous grandparenthood is
inappropriate and that the use of posthumous reproduction and PMSR should
be reserved for surviving partners and spouses of the deceased.

17

Simana, supra note 15, at 350.
Id.
19
Id. at 339, 352; see Shira Rubin, In Israel, Becoming a Dad After Death, UNDARK (Feb. 25,
2019), https://undark.org/2019/02/25/posthumous-reproduction-israel-dad/ (discussing Israeli court
decisions denying grieving parents the right to posthumously reproduce using their deceased son’s
gametes and a gestational carrier due to “potential harm to the child”) (“[S]ociety does not know how
such a child ‘will feel to know that he is not an individual, but a copy of someone else’—what Israeli
judges in the past have called a ‘living monument to the dead.’”).
20
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous Retrieval and Use of Gametes
and Embryos: An Ethics Committee Opinion, 110 FERTILITY & STERILITY 45, 48–49 (2018) (noting that
“the desires of the [deceased’s] parents [do not] give them any ethical claim to their child’s gametes”).
18

806

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:3

This Note cannot and will not reach every ethical question that is raised
by the use of posthumous reproduction and PMSR. However, the judiciary
and the legislature must begin to grapple with these preliminary questions,
as well as others that this Note has not reached, before they can effectively
and thoughtfully regulate posthumous reproduction and PMSR, which they
have failed to do thus far.
II. SURVEY OF THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Judicial Decisions
1. The Parpalaix Case and the Donor Intent Standard
In 1981, the Tribunal de Grande Instance, a French court, became the
first judicial body to decide whether a deceased man’s sperm could be used
for posthumous reproduction and to establish a test for determining who
should be given control of his sperm following his death.21 Alain Parpalaix,
who had been diagnosed with testicular cancer and warned that his
chemotherapy treatment could leave him sterile if he recovered, deposited
his sperm with the Centre d’etude de Conservation du Sperme (CECOS).22
Alain later married his girlfriend, Corinne, two days before losing his fight
with cancer.23 Following Alain’s death, Corinne attempted to retrieve his
sperm from CECOS to use for her own insemination, but CECOS refused.24
Consequently, Corinne, along with Alain’s parents, sued CECOS to recover
the sperm.25 Together, they put forth an emotional plea in addition to their
legal arguments: “Let her give life to this child, the fruit of a love that she
goes on expressing with quiet determination. It is her most sacred right.”26
At the start, the Parpalaix court rejected arguments on both sides of the
dispute. Alain’s family contended that his sperm was subject to the law of
inheritance that made it the property of his heirs.27 CECOS contended that,
without an express manifestation of Alain’s intent to provide his sperm to
Corinne for posthumous reproduction, she could not recover his sperm.28 The
court dismissed the family’s notion that sperm is inheritable property, as well
as CECOS’s position that express, written consent by Alain was required.29
21
Parpalaix c. CECOS is unreported, and, seemingly, the original text of the decision is
unavailable. As such, this Note’s discussion of Parpalaix is based on Gail A. Katz’s retelling. See Gail
A. Katz, Note, Parpalaix c. CECOS: Protecting Intent in Reproductive Technology, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 683, 683–84 (1998) (citing T.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. du Pal. 1984, 2, pan. jurisp., 560).
22
Id. at 684.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 684–85.
26
Id. at 685.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 686–87.
29
Id. at 686.
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Still, the court decided that the deceased’s intent to procreate was dispositive
of the proper use of his sperm and embarked on an inquiry to determine
Alain’s intent for the posthumous use of his sperm.30 Notably, the court did
not find Alain’s failure to contract for posthumous reproduction by Corinne to
be dispositive.31 After an investigation into the circumstances surrounding
Alain’s death and its aftermath—namely, that Alain’s parents supported
Corinne’s decision to seek posthumous reproduction using his sperm, that
Alain and Corinne’s marriage was motivated in part by a desire to eliminate
red tape surrounding posthumous reproduction, and that Alain was unaware
of CECOS’s objection to posthumous reproduction using donor sperm—the
court inferred that Alain intended to posthumously conceive a child with
Corinne and ordered that his sperm be placed in her possession.32 In doing so,
the Parpalaix court established a standard of prioritizing donor intent in the
resolution of reproductive technology disputes.
2. Davis v. Davis and the Balancing Interests Standard
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Tennessee issued the first American
judicial decision on the proper disposition of frozen embryos following a
divorce in Davis v. Davis.33 Mrs. Davis, in the immediate aftermath of her
and her husband’s divorce, sought possession of frozen embryos that the
couple had commissioned a fertility clinic to produce and store during their
marriage.34 Mrs. Davis originally intended to use the embryos to become
pregnant, but Mr. Davis strongly objected, stating that his preference was to
leave the embryos in storage.35 The trial court issued the embryos to Mrs.
Davis, bestowing “custody” on her, based on its assertion that the embryos
were “human beings.”36 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision, holding that Mr. Davis had a constitutional right not to father a
child where no conception had occurred and holding that there was no
justification for ordering implantation or insemination of Mrs. Davis against
Mr. Davis’ objection.37 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, the parties’ circumstances and objectives had changed. Both Mr.
and Mrs. Davis had remarried, and Mrs. Davis no longer wanted to use the
embryos herself; instead, she hoped to receive the court’s permission to

30

Id. at 686–87.
Id. at 686.
32
Id. at 686–87.
33
842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), reh’g granted in part, Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL
341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev’d, No.
180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff’d, 842 S.W.2d 588, reh’g granted in
part, 1992 WL 341632.
37
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
31
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donate them. Mr. Davis remained opposed to Mrs. Davis’ proposed
disposition of the embryos, and he sought the court’s permission to have
them destroyed.39
First, the Davis court held that the Davises’ un-implanted embryos were
neither human beings nor movable property; rather, they “occup[ied] an
interim category that entitle[d] them to special respect because of their
potential for human life.”40 Therefore, neither of the Davises had a
traditional property interest in the embryos, but each had an ownership
interest in the embryos that entitled them to some “decision-making
authority” over their disposition.41 Reminiscent of the Parpalaix court’s
emphasis on donor intent, the Davis court noted that “decisional authority”
over the use of the parties’ genetic material belonged to “the
gamete-providers alone” and that “no other person or entity has an interest
sufficient to permit interference” with the gamete-providers’ choices and
intentions.42 Second, the court concluded that both Mr. and Mrs. Davis held
a constitutional right to procreational autonomy in “the right to procreate
and the right to avoid procreation,” respectively.43
Finally, absent any relevant case law, statutory guidance, or written
agreement between the parties to govern,44 the Davis court developed a
three-step framework to balance the parties’ interests for use in the case at
bar and in future similar disputes.45 First, courts should carry out “the
preferences of the progenitors.”46 Second, when the progenitors’ preferences
are unclear or disputed, a prior, enforceable agreement regarding the
disposition of the embryos should be carried out.47 Third, where there is no
prior, enforceable agreement, the interests of the parties should be balanced
to determine the proper disposition of the embryos.48 As a default rule, where
one party wishes to “avoid procreation” and the other “has a reasonable
possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than” the use of the
embryos in dispute, the party seeking to avoid procreation should prevail.49
If the party seeking procreation has “no other reasonable alternatives,” their
38

Id. at 590.
Id.
40
Id. at 597.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 602.
43
Id. at 603.
44
See id. at 589–90 (noting that the case presents a “question of first impression,” and there existed
no “written agreement” or “statute governing such disposition”).
45
See id. at 603–04 (“Resolving disputes over conflicting interests of constitutional import is a task
familiar to the courts. One way of resolving these disputes is to consider the positions of the parties, the
significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions.”).
46
Id. at 604.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
39
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use of the embryos in dispute should be given due consideration. As an
exception to this default rule, the party seeking to avoid procreation should
prevail if the party seeking to use the embryos only wishes to donate them,
rather than use them to bring about a child of their own.51
3. Hecht v. Superior Court: Broadening Davis
In 1993, a California court became the first in America to decide a dispute
concerning posthumous reproduction.52 Before William Kane died by suicide,
he deposited his sperm in a Los Angeles sperm bank.53 The written agreement
he entered into with the sperm bank permitted it to release his sperm to his
girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, or her physician.54 The agreement provided that, in
the event of Kane’s death, the bank should “[c]ontinue to store [the specimens]
upon request of the executor of the estate [or] [r]elease the specimens to the
executor of the estate.”55 Subsequently, Kane executed a will, naming Hecht
as the executor of his estate and stating that “should she so desire,” it would
be his “wish” that she use his deposited sperm to “become impregnated . . .
before or after [his] death.”56
Kane’s adult children brought an action seeking to destroy Kane’s
frozen sperm to “help guard the family unit” by preventing both the creation
of a non-traditional family and the “disruption of [an] existing famil[y] by
after-born children.”57 In response, Hecht argued that Kane’s children had
no property interest in or right to his sperm, as it had been gifted to her at
the time of the deposit.58 Furthermore, Hecht contended that destroying the
sperm over her objections “would violate her rights to privacy and
procreation under the federal and California constitutions.”59 Following a
hearing, the lower court ordered that Kane’s sperm should be destroyed.60
Hecht successfully filed for an order staying execution of the trial court’s
decision, bringing the case to the California Court of Appeal.61
The Hecht court began by adopting the Davis court’s decision regarding
the status of gametic material—that it “occup[ies] an interim category”62
50

Id.
Id.
52
See Hecht v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“This proceeding
presents several matters of first impression involving the disposition of cryogenically-preserved sperm
of a deceased.”).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 276–77.
57
Id. at 279.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 279–80.
61
Id. at 280.
62
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), reh’g granted in part, No. 34, 1992 WL
341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
51
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between living thing and movable property because its value “lies in its
potential to create a child.”63 The court concluded that Kane, at the time of his
death, had an ownership interest in his frozen sperm “to the extent that he had
decision making authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction.”64 The
court went on to hold that his interest constituted a property interest under
California’s Probate Code.65 Kane’s children responded by arguing that,
regardless of whether the disposition of his sperm fell within the jurisdiction
of the probate court, Kane and Hecht’s intended use for the sperm violated
public policy two-fold, and it should be prohibited.66 Namely, Kane’s children
asserted that both the artificial insemination of an unmarried woman and the
use of a deceased man’s sperm in an artificial insemination were contrary to
public policy.67 The Hecht court declined to hold that either act was violative
of California’s public policy.68
As for artificial insemination of an unmarried woman, the court noted that
neither California’s courts nor its legislature had looked negatively on the
practice in recent history.69 When deciding Jhordan C. v. Mary K., an earlier
case regarding the determination of paternity in an artificial insemination
dispute, the California Court of Appeal had interpreted a section of California’s
Civil Code—an adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)—to provide
“unmarried as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen
for artificial insemination.”70 The court in Jhordan C. noted that it did not wish
“to express any judicial preference toward traditional notions of family
structure or toward providing a father where a single woman has chosen to
bear a child” and that it would defer to the legislature to determine public
policy on issues of marriage and family.71 California’s legislature had already
made clear that it was an unmarried woman’s right to be artificially
inseminated by adopting the UPA’s artificial insemination provision72
word-for-word with one exception: the exclusion of the UPA’s use of the word
“married.”73 The courts in Jhordan C. and Hecht agreed that, if the California
legislature wished to steer public policy away from the artificial insemination
63

Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 284.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 284, 290–91.
69
Id. 284–86 (discussing precedent which avoids establishing judicial preference on issues of
marriage and family).
70
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). For information on the
UPA, see infra Part I.B.2.
71
Id. at 537.
72
The UPA provision in place at the time narrowed a sperm donor’s nonpaternity to situations in
which a “married woman other than the donor’s wife” is artificially inseminated. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 5(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
73
Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285–86.
64
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of unmarried women, it would have adopted the UPA provision as originally
written, rather than adopting it with a change that broadened its scope.74 Given
the lack of authority supporting Kane’s children’s argument, the court
concluded that it was not contrary to public policy to allow an unmarried
woman to pursue artificial insemination.75
As for the public policy implicated by permitting artificial insemination
using a deceased man’s sperm, the Hecht court noted the absence of
any authority allowing it to substitute its judgment for that of the
gamete-providers and override their choice to procreate.76 As in Davis, there
existed no “statement of public policy which reveal[ed] [a governmental]
interest that could justify infringing on gamete-providers’ decisional
authority.”77 Kane’s children argued that the court should continue to apply
the Davis framework, specifically contending that Hecht’s claim should fail
because, in their opinion, she could pursue other means of procreation.78
However, the court distinguished Hecht from Davis on this point, noting that
the Davis framework applied to disputes where the progenitors disagreed as
to the disposition of their genetic material.79 Because Hecht and Kane agreed
on how to use Kane’s sperm, further application of the Davis framework was
unnecessary.80 The Hecht court was limited to decide only whether public
policy necessitated prohibiting Hecht’s intended use of the sperm and
concluded that it did not, thus overruling the trial court’s order that Kane’s
sperm be destroyed.81
To be clear, the Hecht court did not hold that endorsing posthumous
reproduction is favorable public policy. It only hedged that “no other person
or entity has an interest sufficient to permit interference with the
gamete-providers’ decision . . . because no one else bears the consequences
of these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers do.”82 Thus, the
Hecht court broadened the application of Davis’ emphasis on donor intent
and balancing interests from disputes concerning disposition of embryos to
those concerning posthumous reproduction.

74

See id. (“We agree with the reasoning in Jhordan C.; had the Legislature intended to express a
public policy against procreative rights of unmarried women or against artificial insemination of
unmarried women, it would not have excluded the word ‘married’”).
75
Id. at 287.
76
Id. at 288–89.
77
Id. at 289 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992)).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See id. (“[T]he only issue which we address is whether artificial insemination with the sperm of
a decedent violates public policy. There is nothing in Davis which indicates that such artificial
insemination violates public policy.”).
82
Id. (quoting Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602).
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4. Cases Deciding the Rights and Status of Posthumously Conceived
Children
A discussion of the jurisprudence surrounding posthumous reproduction
would be incomplete without a discussion of actions involving paternity and
inheritance. Most often, these disputes arise in the context of Social Security
and death benefits, and they are decided according to the particular state’s
inheritance law.83 Massachusetts employs a three-prong test to secure benefits
for a posthumously conceived child in which the surviving parent must show
that there is a genetic relationship between the deceased parent and the child;
that the deceased parent had “affirmatively consented” to posthumous
reproduction; and that the deceased parent had “affirmatively consented . . . to
the support of any resulting child.”84 In New Hampshire and Arkansas,
posthumously conceived children are ineligible to inherit from the deceased
parent as a matter of law;85 courts in both states appealed to their respective
legislatures to address the issue via policy.86 Federal courts have reached the
same conclusion—that posthumously conceived children are not the issue of
their deceased parent and are thus prohibited from inheritance—by applying
the intestacy law of the state in which the deceased parent died.87 The United
States Supreme Court, in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., solidified this
developing default rule by relegating the determination of a posthumously
conceived child’s legal status to the intestacy laws of the state in which the
deceased parent’s will was executed.88
These cases reveal a pattern: states’ intestacy laws are, by and large,
either lacking any mention of, or do not grant any affirmative rights to,
posthumously conceived children.89 Under the current jurisprudence, this

83
Joanna L. Grossman, A Growing Debate over the Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children:
Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Sept. 20, 2011),
https://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/20/a-growing-debate-over-the-rights-of-posthumously-conceived-chi
ldren-2.
84
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
85
Khabbaz v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007); Finley v. Astrue, 270
S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008).
86
See Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1186 (“We reserve such matters of public policy for the legislature.”);
Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 855 (“[W]e strongly encourage the General Assembly to revisit the intestacy
succession statutes to address the issues involved in the instant case and those that have not but will likely
evolve.”).
87
See Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he SSA is not excluding all
posthumously-conceived children, only those that do not meet the statutory requirements under State
law.”); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The Commissioner . . . interprets the Act
to provide that a natural child of the decedent is not entitled to benefits unless she has inheritance rights
under state law . . . . We conclude that the Commissioner’s interpretation is, at a minimum, reasonable
and entitled to deference.”).
88
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 559 (2012).
89
See, e.g., Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Arizona law does not
deal specifically with posthumously-conceived children . . . .”); see also Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (distinguishing the intestacy statutes governing the result
in Gillett-Netting, which did not account for posthumously conceived children, from the Florida intestacy
statutes, which “do[] deal specifically with posthumously-conceived children”).
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gap in the law singlehandedly deprives posthumously conceived children of
the ability to establish their parentage and to inherit.
5. Judicial Impact on Posthumous Reproduction
The judicial decisions pertaining to posthumous reproduction and the
rights of posthumously conceived children point to two conclusions. First,
the progenitors’ intent is the key to resolving disputes arising out of
posthumous reproduction and, more broadly, ART in general. Second, there
is a widespread failure by state legislatures and Congress to act effectively
in response to the growing use of ART, posthumous reproduction, and the
increasingly complex legal disputes that arise in these areas. As this Note
discusses in the subpart, there are still numerous legal questions about the
circumstances in which posthumous reproduction is appropriate that the
judiciary has not spoken on because of its deference to legislatures.
B. Statutes
1. Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) sets forth important standards for
determining the rights and parentage of posthumously conceived children.
Currently, eighteen states have adopted the 2010 version of the UPC.90
However, the 2010 UPC is not the most recent version; the Uniform Law
Commission published a newly amended UPC in 2019, which has yet to be
adopted by any state.91
Section 2-120(f) of the 2010 UPC provides, in relevant part:
[A] parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted
reproduction and an individual other than the birth mother who
consented to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent
to be treated as the other parent of the child. Consent to assisted
reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the
other parent of the child is established if the individual . . . signed
a record that, considering all the facts and circumstances,
evidences the individual’s consent[] or . . . intended to be treated
as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, if that intent is
established by clear and convincing evidence.92

90
The states that have adopted the 2010 UPC are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. Probate Code 2010, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=a539920d-c477-44b884fe-b0d7b1a4cca8 (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
91
Probate Code 2019, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=35a4e3e3-de91-4527-aeec-26b1fc41b1c3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
92
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(f) (2010) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 2019) [hereinafter UPC 2010].
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It also provides, “[i]f the birth mother is a surviving spouse and at her
deceased spouse’s death no divorce proceeding was pending, in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,” the deceased spouse is
presumed to have the requisite intent to establish parentage of a
posthumously conceived child.93
Read together, these two provisions indicate that the favorable outcome
is to establish parentage wherever possible, provided there is clear evidence
that the deceased parent consented. Rather than dismissing a deceased
parent’s parentage and the inheritance rights of their posthumously
conceived child where there was no marriage between the parents, the 2010
UPC includes no language requiring a spousal relationship. Instead, the
second provision functions to recognize the likelihood that those in a spousal
relationship may be more likely to consent to posthumous reproduction. The
provisions can be read as an attempt to serve judicial economy by codifying
a presumption in favor of married persons without creating a substantial
barrier to unmarried persons looking to posthumously reproduce.
The 2019 UPC, yet to be adopted by any state,94 eliminates these provisions
as a response to the recently amended Uniform Parentage Act of 2017,95 which
incorporates most of the relevant language contained in the 2010 UPC.96 The
2017 Uniform Parentage Act and the 2019 UPC now effectively function as
one, as far as each pertains to posthumous reproduction.
2. Uniform Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) serves to guide determinations of
parentage as ART sees rapid developments and family structures become
more diverse in the United States. The UPA was most recently amended in
2017, and six states—California, Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington—have since enacted it as governing law on the subject.97 The
next most-recently amended UPA, amended in 2002, is the governing law in

93

Id. § 2-120(h)(2).
Probate Code 2019, supra note 91.
95
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019) (noting that “parentage of an
individual conceived by assisted reproduction is determined under . . . [the] Uniform Parentage Act
(2017)”) [hereinafter UPC 2019].
96
See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (establishing parentage of
a posthumously conceived child only with written consent of the deceased parent or “clear-andconvincing evidence”) [hereinafter UPA 2017].
97
Parentage Act 2017, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Apr. 6, 2022).
Connecticut adopted a substantially similar law. Id.
94
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nine states. Maine and Washington originally enacted the 2002 UPA, but
have since enacted the amended 2017 UPA as governing law.99
The 2002 UPA includes a “Parental Status of Deceased Individual”
provision, which provides, in relevant part:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by
assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if
the assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
individual would be a parent of the child.100
This rule requires express, written consent prior to death from the
deceased parent of a posthumously conceived child. Absent this consent, the
rule does not recognize the deceased parent as the posthumously conceived
child’s parent. It is also important to note that inclusion of the word “spouse”
in this rule presumes that those who would, or should, posthumously
conceive are spouses, which excludes unmarried partners to some degree.101
Under this rule, the prevailing party in Hecht, the deceased’s girlfriend,
could have been prevented from pursuing posthumous reproduction.
Unlike the 2002 UPA’s provision, the 2017 UPA’s “Parental Status of
Deceased Individual” provision provides, in relevant part:
If an individual who consented in a record to assisted
reproduction by a woman who agreed to give birth to a child
dies before a transfer of gametes or embryos, the deceased
individual is a parent of a child conceived by the assisted
reproduction only if:
98
The states in which the 2002 UPA is the governing law are Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Parentage Act 2002, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=5d5c48d6-623f-4d01-99
94-6933ca8af315 (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
99
Parentage Act 2002, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=5d5c48d6-623f-4d01-9994-6933ca8af315 (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); Parentage
Act 2017, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Community
Key=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Apr. 6, 2022).
100
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 2017) [hereinafter UPA 2002].
101
The 2002 UPA does not define “spouse,” but the 2008 American Bar Association Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology defined a “legal spouse” as “an individual married to
another, or who has a legal relationship to another that this state accords rights and responsibilities equal
to, or substantially equivalent to, those of marriage.” AM. BAR ASS’N MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED
REPROD. TECH. § 102(21) (2008) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2019). Although the ABA has replaced this
definition, see supra text accompanying note 104, adapting it to the UPA would allow for those in a civil
union or domestic partnership, as defined by the individuals’ state statutes, to posthumously conceive.
Notably, the 2017 UPA does not include a definition of “spouse” or “legal spouse.” See generally UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 102 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (defining terms relevant to the Act). As discussed in
Part II.B.1, supra, the 2017 UPA also includes no presumption or requirement of marriage in its provision
pertaining to posthumous reproduction.
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(1) either:
(A) the individual consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after the death of the individual,
the individual would be a parent of the child; or
(B) the individual’s intent to be a parent of a child conceived
by assisted reproduction after the individual’s death is
established by clear-and-convincing evidence; and
(2) either:
(A) the embryo is in utero not later than [36] months after the
individual’s death; or
(B) the child is born not later than [45] months after the
individual’s death.102
This rule indicates a preference for the deceased’s express, written
consent to posthumous reproduction to establish parentage, but it provides a
secondary route, as well. A surviving parent seeking to establish a
posthumously conceived child’s parentage can also succeed by providing
“clear-and-convincing evidence”103 of the deceased parent’s intent if, and
only if, the child was gestating or born within the appropriate time period
following the deceased parent’s death. This rule also eliminates any mention
or requirement of a marriage prior to the deceased parent’s death and the
posthumously conceived child’s birth. As a result, the revised rule keeps
with the seminal holding in Hecht, without sacrificing its focus on the
deceased parent’s intent and consent to posthumous reproduction. The
“clear-and-convincing” evidence standard in this context is vague, but its
inclusion, in conjunction with the temporal restraints, appears to be an
attempt to balance the governmental and personal interests implicated by
posthumous reproduction.
3.

The ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction

In January 2019, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the
ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction to replace its 2008
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology.104 The Act is
meant to provide a readily adaptable regulatory framework for states to
enact.105 The Model Act includes a provision titled “Parental Status of
Deceased Individual,” which provides, in relevant part:
102

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
Id. § 708(b)(1)(B). The 2017 UPA does not include a definition of “clear-and-convincing
evidence.” See generally id. § 102 (defining terms relevant to the Act).
104
AM. BAR ASS’N MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/family_law/committees/art/resolution111.pdf [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
105
Id.
103
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Except as otherwise provided in the enacting jurisdiction’s
probate code, if an individual who consented in a Record to be
a Parent by Assisted Reproduction dies before an insemination
or Embryo Transfer, the deceased individual is not a Parent of
the resulting Child unless the deceased spouse consented in a
Record that if Assisted Reproduction were to occur after death,
the deceased individual would be a Parent of the Child.106
This rule essentially codifies the Supreme Court’s holding in Astrue v.
Capato ex rel. B.N.C, leaving it to the states to decide the parentage107 and
inheritance108 rights of posthumously conceived children,109 with the default
being that parentage and inheritance are denied. Like the 2002 and 2017
UPA, the Model Act requires a clear expression of the deceased’s intent and
consent to posthumous reproduction. However, although it was drafted after
the 2017 UPA eliminated language requiring marriage in order for a
surviving parent to establish the deceased parent’s parentage of a
posthumously conceived child, the 2019 Model Act retains language
indicating that a marriage between the parents is a prerequisite to
establishing the deceased parent’s parentage.
4. Institutional Guidelines for Posthumous Reproduction
In the absence of national regulation, and, in many cases, state
regulation110 of posthumous reproduction and PMSR, the medical facilities
that manage these technologies have led the charge on their regulation.111 It
is now commonplace for a private facility to enact its own guidelines for
posthumous reproduction and PMSR.112 Medical experts in the field
recommend that, in developing guidelines for the practice, facilities are
mindful of and strive to balance the interests of the deceased, the requesting
party, the resultant child, the physician, and society.113 Depending on how
each individual institution chooses to balance those interests, the resulting
guidelines typically fall into one of two categories: the limited-role approach
or the family-centered approach.114

106

Id. § 607.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 549–50, 553 (2012).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 559.
110
See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer, 35 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 433, 441 (2009) (“Most states have no statutes dealing expressly with posthumous reproduction.”).
111
See generally Postmortem Sperm Retrieval (PMSR), supra note 5 (outlining the considerations
made and requirements that must be met by the requesting party for the facility to perform PMSR).
112
Zinkel et al., supra note 3, at 406.
113
Frances R. Batzer, Joshua M. Hurwitz & Arthur Caplan, Postmortem Parenthood and the Need
for a Protocol with Posthumous Sperm Procurement, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1263, 1265 (2003).
114
Zinkel et al., supra note 3, at 406.
107
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In the limited-role approach, the prospective father’s pre-mortem
written consent to the procedure, and to posthumous reproduction, is
required, including an affirmative statement outlining to whom the sperm
should be given.115 In the family-centered approach, the requesting party
may substitute their judgment in the absence of the deceased’s written
consent.116 However, the requesting party must undergo psychological
counseling for a period of time to evaluate whether posthumous
reproduction is the best choice for them before they are permitted to use the
sperm.117 Exact guidelines vary among each institution but will typically fall
into one of these approaches.
One institution that adheres to a limited-role approach characterizes the
hallmarks of its guidelines as “evidence of intended paternity for the
deceased man, . . . next of kin . . . consent (ie [sic] only the wife can give
consent for PMSR), . . . the death was sudden[,] . . . and consent to a 1-year
waiting period for bereavement and assessment of recipient.”118 Weill
Cornell Medicine, within New York-Presbyterian Hospital, is another
institution that has adopted limited-role guidelines to dictate its use of
PMSR.119 The facility “only considers requests for sperm retrieval from the
decedent’s wife,” excluding all others.120 Weill Cornell’s guidelines provide
that “[t]he wife should be the primary provider of the deceased’s intentions
to procreate and . . . the only person for whom the sperm could be used for
procreation.”121 The facility also limits PMSR to cases in which it is
requested “within 24 hours of death” and encourages the requesting party to
take at least one year to consider whether they truly want to procreate using
the posthumously retrieved sperm.122 At the time of this writing, there appear
to be no publicly available PMSR institutional guidelines that take a
family-centered approach. This could be explained by the family-centered
approach’s patient-focused philosophy, a hesitancy to use an approach that
contradicts the principles behind existing regulation, or a confirmation that
the family-centered approach has been adopted by a minority of institutions.

115

Id.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Jennifer A. Tash et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Effect of Instituting Guidelines, 170 J.
UROLOGY 1922, 1922 (2003).
119
See generally Postmortem Sperm Retrieval (PMSR), supra note 5 (setting out requirements for
the use of PMSR, including affirmative, written consent).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
116
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK
A. Constitutional Questions Arising from Current Posthumous Reproduction
Regulation
The existing regulatory framework governing posthumous reproduction
and PMSR has resolved certain issues, including whether sperm constitutes
property and what interests the provider and the intended recipient of sperm
have in its disposition.123 However, the existing regulatory framework leaves
unanswered several vital questions concerning the constitutional rights of
those who seek to use posthumous reproduction and PMSR. For instance, is
there a constitutional right to conceive via ART and, more specifically,
through posthumously gathered sperm? Considering that the judicial
decisions relating to these technologies rely heavily on the constitutional
right to privacy in reproduction and reproductive decision-making, this Note
argues that the constitutional right extends to reproduction via ART and
posthumous reproduction. Assuming that there is a constitutional right to
procreate through ART and its available forms, including posthumous
reproduction and PMSR, does that right depend on one’s marital status? In
some states, yes.124 Furthermore, does a posthumously conceived child have
the same right to inherit and receive benefits from its deceased father as a
child born before their father’s death? In many states, no.125 Justifying the
dissimilar rights afforded to unmarried versus married persons and
posthumously conceived versus non-posthumously conceived children in
ART-centered disputes is an arduous task. It appears that neither the judicial
branch nor the legislative branch of government is interested in attempting
to settle the rule of law or in establishing a comprehensive regulatory
framework in this area. It is likely that, because of this governmental inertia,
individuals seeking posthumous reproduction or PMSR—and the children
who are the result of those technologies—will find that their rights are
determined according to their, or their parents’, marital status.

123
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (finding un-implanted embryos are
neither human beings nor movable property “but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life”); Hecht v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (adopting the Davis court's finding because “the value of sperm lies in its potential to
create a child”).
124
See supra note 98 (listing the states that have adopted the 2002 UPA, which effectively prohibits
unmarried persons who do not meet the requirements of their state’s definition of civil union or domestic
partnership from pursuing posthumous reproduction).
125
See generally discussion supra Part I (asserting that “states’ intestacy laws are, by and large,
either lacking any mention of, or do not grant any affirmative rights to, posthumously conceived
children”).
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B. Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Regulation of Posthumous
Reproduction
1. Skinner v. Oklahoma
The constitutional right to procreate was established in 1942 in Skinner
v. Oklahoma,126 in which the Supreme Court departed from the precedent set
in its 1927 decision in Buck v. Bell, which permitted the sterilization of a
cognitively impaired eighteen-year-old woman to “promote” “her welfare
and that of society.”127 Oklahoma’s Attorney General intended to sterilize
Skinner pursuant to his status as a “habitual criminal” under Oklahoma’s
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.128 The Court was in agreement that the
statute at issue implicated one’s personal and protected liberties.129 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, began the opinion, “Oklahoma deprives
certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race—the
right to have offspring.”130 The Court held that Oklahoma’s statute was
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because of
its inherent “inequalities.”131 Certain felonies were exempt from the “moral
turpitude” classification underlying the definition of “habitual criminals.”132
For instance, larceny was considered to involve moral turpitude while
embezzlement was not, thus subjecting perpetrators of larceny to sterilization
under the statute but sparing embezzlers.133 Essentially, the classifications
made by the Oklahoma statute had no rhyme or reason behind them. The Court
emphasized that classifications made by laws implicating one’s right to
procreate should be subject to strict scrutiny review.134
2. Griswold v. Connecticut
The constitutional right to privacy in making procreative decisions
within one’s marriage was established in 1965 by the Supreme Court in

126
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (holding that Oklahoma’s
sterilization statute was unconstitutional because of “its failure to meet the requirements of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
127
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
128
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. The statute defined “habitual criminal” as someone with at least two
past convictions for crimes “amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude” who is then convicted of
another such felony in Oklahoma and sentenced to imprisonment in the state. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit.
57, § 173 (1935)).
129
Id. at 541 (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man.”).
130
Id. at 536.
131
Id. at 538.
132
Id. at 541.
133
Id. at 538–39 (“A clerk who appropriates over $20 from his employer’s till and a stranger who
steals the same amount are thus both guilty of felonies. If the latter . . . is convicted three times, he may
be sterilized. But the clerk is not subject to the pains and penalties of the Act . . . .”) (citation omitted).
134
See id. at 541 (noting that strict scrutiny review of sterilization laws’ classifications is “essential”).
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Griswold v. Connecticut. Connecticut statutes at the time provided that
“[a]ny person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or be
both fined and imprisoned” and that “[a]ny person who assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be
prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”136 The
appellants, a gynecologist and a Planned Parenthood administrator, were
arrested and convicted of violating the statutes because they had given
medical advice on contraception and provided contraceptive devices to
married women.137 The Court concluded that the appellants had standing to
“raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a
professional relationship.”138 The Court went on to discuss what it called
“peripheral rights,” as opposed to “specific rights.”139 “[S]pecific rights” are
those that are explicitly outlined in the Constitution, such as the freedom of
speech.140 “[P]eripheral rights” are those that can be inferred from, or
implied by, specific rights.141 The Court posited that this amalgam of specific
and peripheral rights forming the Constitution implies that “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance,” and that some of
these guarantees, taken together, “create zones of privacy.”142 The Court
concluded that those zones of privacy create a “right to privacy, no less
important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people,” which encompasses the procreative decision-making of a married
couple.143 According to the Court, upholding the Connecticut statute and
denying contraceptives to married persons would be “repulsive,” akin to
permitting police searches of “marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives.”144
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird extended its holding
in Griswold, establishing the right of unmarried persons to use
contraceptives and, more broadly, establishing that the right to privacy
135
381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (referring to privacy within one’s marriage as a right “older than
the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system”).
136
Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)).
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Id.
138
Id. at 481.
139
Id. at 482–83 (“Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.”).
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Id.
141
Id. (noting that established rights such as “[t]he right to educate a child in a school of the parents’
choice” and “the right to study any particular subject or any foreign language” are not expressly written
into the Constitution, but it has nevertheless been “construed to include certain of those rights”).
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Id. at 484.
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Id. at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)).
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Id. at 485–86.
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belongs to all individuals regardless of marital status.
Baird, a
reproductive rights activist of sorts, provided a contraceptive device to a
young woman while lecturing at a college.146 He was subsequently convicted
under a Massachusetts statute making it a felony to provide contraception to
unmarried persons.147
The Court held that the Massachusetts statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it denied contraception to
single persons without a compelling explanation for “the different treatment
accorded married and unmarried persons.”148 The Court reasoned that, if the
procreative decisions of married persons cannot be infringed upon, neither
can those of single persons, since a married couple is not a like-minded unit
but “an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup.”149 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained
that, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”150 In essence, Eisenstadt stands for the principle that one’s
right to make his or her own reproductive decisions is not subject to arbitrary
classifications and is essential to individual freedom.
4. Carey v. Population Services International
While Eisenstadt established the right to make one’s own procreative
decisions without government intrusion, the Supreme Court clarified the
types of decisions that are protected in Carey v. Population Services
International.151 Carey came before the Court after a corporation that sold
mail-order contraceptives was advised that its failure to comply with a New
York statute—criminalizing the advertising of contraceptives, the sale of
contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen, and the distribution of
contraceptives to anyone over the age of sixteen by anyone other than a
licensed pharmacist—would subject it to legal action.152 The company,
Population Services International, challenged the New York statute as an
unconstitutional intrusion into its customers’ right to privacy.153 The Court
agreed with Population Services International, holding that, “where a
decision . . . to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a
145

405 U.S. 438, 443, 453 (1972).
Id. at 440, 445 (“The very point of Baird’s giving away the vaginal foam was to challenge the
Massachusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives.”).
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Id. at 440–41.
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Id. at 447.
149
Id. at 453.
150
Id.
151
431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977).
152
Id. at 681–83.
153
Id. at 683–84.
146

2022]

POSTMORTEM SPERM RETRIEVAL

823

burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be
narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”154 The New York statute
did not meet those requirements.155 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
reflected on the Court’s prior jurisprudence concerning the right to privacy:
Th[e] right of personal privacy includes “the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”
While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been
marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government
interference are personal decisions “relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education.” The decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices. That decision holds a particularly important
place in the history of the right of privacy . . . .156
In Skinner, the Court placed the right to procreate among “the basic civil
rights of man” and concluded that classifications which infringe on an
individual’s right to procreate are subject to strict scrutiny review.157 In
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey, the Court protected the individual’s right
to make decisions that would prevent their own procreation via available
technology.158 This Note argues that this right also applies in the
alternative—protecting the individual’s right to make decisions that would
promote their own procreation via available technology—though the Court
has not yet affirmatively stated such a proposition. In particular, the Carey
Court’s inclusion of “procreation,” “family relationships,” and “child
rearing” as “decisions that an individual may make without unjustified
government interference”159 indicates that one’s choice to conceive and bear
a child with the help of advancements in the field of ART is protected from
governmental intrusion, absent a narrowly tailored mandate that furthers a
compelling state interest.
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Id. at 686.
Id. at 678–79, 681–82, 684–86, 690.
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Id. at 684–85 (citations omitted) (first quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977);
then quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)).
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
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C. An Affirmative Right to Non-Discriminatory Regulation of Posthumous
Reproduction and PMSR
The holdings of the constitutional right to privacy cases—Skinner,
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey—together with the holdings of the
seminal American ART and posthumous reproduction cases—Davis and
Hecht—establish an individual’s right to use ART, including methods of
posthumous reproduction, to conceive and bear a child. To put it in the terms
of the Griswold Court, the right to procreate is a “specific right[],” while the
rights to use ART in general, to pursue posthumous reproduction, and to
pursue PMSR are “peripheral rights.”160 Justice Douglas’s sentiment in
Griswold is just as relevant here: “Without those peripheral rights[,] the
specific rights would be less secure.”161 The reticence of American courts
and legislatures to affirmatively establish the peripheral rights pertaining to
ART is already actively harming certain individuals’ right to procreate,
particularly unmarried individuals.
Publicly available institutional guidelines governing medical facilities
that provide posthumous reproduction services and perform PMSR
expressly, or impliedly, exclude unmarried individuals from taking
advantage of those technologies.162 Without national or state regulation
governing when it is appropriate to grant requests for PMSR, unmarried
persons will become increasingly prohibited from pursuing it if current
trends continue. Statutes in nine states governing parentage determinations
effectively disinherit posthumously conceived children whose parents were
not married.163 Worse still is that most states have not enacted any statutory
framework that contemplates posthumous reproduction, PMSR, or the rights
of posthumously conceived children.164
These restrictions on the right of unmarried individuals to posthumously
reproduce and the ill effects they have on posthumously conceived children
constitute an unacceptable infringement on the constitutional right of
unmarried partners to carry out their procreative plans. Taken together,
Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey recognize that the rights to procreate
and to make decisions regarding one’s procreation are fundamental rights
upon which governmental intrusion should be subject to strict scrutiny review.
To limit these rights, the government must show that its legislation is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest. While there may be some
160
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compelling state interests in limiting the occurrence of posthumous
reproduction and PMSR through legislation—such as serving judicial
economy, closing estates in a timely manner, and respecting the sanctity, and
permanency, of death165—distinguishing on the basis of marital status is
neither the most narrowly tailored nor the best suited approach to furthering
those interests.
The most important consideration in ART cases is the intention and
affirmative consent of the progenitor to participate in any ART-related
procedure or process.166 Institutional guidelines, state statutes, and model
codes alike emphasize the necessity of determining whether the deceased
would have, or did, affirmatively consent to posthumous reproduction.167
However, marriage does not, in itself, establish consent, despite the
presumption to the contrary inherent in many states’ existing regulations.168
The deceased may have affirmatively consented to or may have had the
requisite intent to pursue posthumous reproduction despite being unmarried,
as was the case in Hecht.169 In the alternative, there are also scenarios in
which the deceased did not consent and did not intend to conceive a
posthumously conceived child despite being married to the requesting
party.170 These scenarios demonstrate that marriage is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish consent to posthumous reproduction. While making
distinctions based on marital status may appear an attractive, and sometimes
effective, shortcut to furthering state interests, it is simply unconstitutional.
Viewing the existing regulatory framework surrounding posthumous
reproduction in conjunction with the jurisprudence establishing the right to
privacy in reproductive decision-making, one can conclude that statutes
barring unmarried persons from pursuing posthumous reproduction
contradict constitutional precedent. These statutes and practices cannot be
considered narrowly tailored enough to further the intended state interests.
Moving forward, legislatures and courts must catch up with the times and
expressly affirm the rights of individuals, regardless of marital status, to
165
See Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath
Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 444 (2009) (discussing possible state interests in prohibiting
certain individuals from pursuing posthumous reproduction).
166
See generally discussion, supra Part I (outlining the foundational jurisprudence on ART and
posthumous reproduction, including the Parpalaix, Davis, and Hecht cases, which place special
importance on the donor’s intent and consent).
167
Postmortem Sperm Retrieval (PMSR), supra note 5; MODEL ACT § 607, supra note 104; UPA
2017, supra note 96; UPA 2002, supra note 100; UPC 2010, supra note 92; UPC 2019, supra note 95.
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See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusionary effect of the 2002
UPA’s “spouse” requirement).
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Hecht v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
170
Kindregan, Jr., supra note 110, at 439 n.29 (citing In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
311, 312–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), “in which a widow sought a court order giving her access to her late
husband’s cryopreserved sperm,” but “the man expressed a desire not to have children” and “executed a
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procreate through ART and to make procreative decisions, including the
decision to pursue posthumous reproduction.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is imperative that legislatures and courts continue to balance the
state’s interests in honoring the wishes of the dead, respecting individuals’
procreative intent, and closing estates in a timely manner with individuals’
interests in maintaining autonomy in reproductive decision-making,
protecting privacy in intimate relationships, and having access to medical
technology. It is possible to enact a regulatory framework pertaining to
posthumous reproduction and PMSR that coexists with modern conceptions
of “partners” and “family” and resists creating discriminatory classifications
based on marital status. There is already an effective, non-discriminatory
model statute establishing the parentage of posthumously conceived
children available for adoption by state or federal government—the 2017
UPA’s “Parental Status of Deceased Individual” provision.171
The 2017 UPA’s rule emphasizes the need for the deceased’s express,
written consent to posthumous reproduction to establish parentage of the
deceased and makes no classifications based on marital status.172 The model
also attempts to balance governmental and individual interests by imposing
a “clear-and-convincing[-]evidence” standard in lieu of the deceased’s
written consent where certain temporal conditions are met.173 Therefore,
states that have adopted the 2002 UPA, which excludes unmarried persons
from establishing posthumously conceived children’s parentage, can
eliminate their discriminatory practices by simply adopting the 2017 UPA.
Furthermore, states that have no statutes governing posthumous
reproduction and its effects on parentage determinations should also look to
adopt the 2017 UPA and the 2019 UPC, which function together.174 States
that have enacted statutes specifically pertaining to posthumous
reproduction should eliminate suspect classifications based on marital status
by ensuring their provisions refer to “individuals,” “persons,” or “parents,”
rather than “spouses,” “husbands,” or “wives.”
Likewise, medical facilities that have instituted guidelines for permitting
PMSR and assisting in posthumous reproduction should make equivalent
edits to their language. Furthermore, institutions should consider adopting a
requirement of written, affirmative consent to PMSR and posthumous
reproduction from the deceased, as well as a requirement that the deceased
identify who should receive their sperm. This specificity would eliminate
the need to deny unmarried individuals access to posthumous reproduction.
171
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If an institution that prefers the family-centered approach did not wish to
adopt a requirement of written, affirmative consent, the best practice would
be a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. Under this standard, a
marriage between the deceased and the requesting party would constitute
one factor of many in the ultimate determination of whether PMSR and
posthumous reproduction is appropriate. Other factors to consider could
include the length and depth of the relationship between the deceased and
the requesting party, testimonials of family members and friends as to the
deceased’s opinions and intent regarding procreation, and the psychological
state of the requesting party.
The Ethics Committee of the ASRM’s guidance outlining best practices
for posthumous reproduction and PMSR can be especially helpful to medical
facilities, courts, and legislative bodies seeking to regulate these
technologies. The ASRM emphasizes that no medical facility is “ethically
obligated” to assist persons seeking to posthumously reproduce, but that any
facility that chooses to do so should institute its own guidelines specifying
“circumstances in which they will or will not participate” in the process.175
The ASRM notes that the main criterion for choosing to perform PMSR in
a given case should be whether documented consent to the process by the
deceased is available.176 However, the ASRM does not expressly advise
against facilitating posthumous reproduction where there is no
documentation of the deceased’s consent; it only advises against granting
such requests that have been initiated by someone other than the deceased’s
surviving spouse or partner, such as the deceased’s parent.177 The ASRM
also stresses the need to allow sufficient time for parties who pursue PMSR
and posthumous reproduction to grieve and seek counseling before
attempting to conceive with the deceased’s gametes.178 Finally, the ASRM
highlights the responsibility of medical facilities and professionals who
practice in ART and posthumous reproduction to familiarize themselves
with the relevant state laws on the legal status of posthumously conceived
children.179 Medical facilities can then advise individuals seeking to
posthumously conceive that they may need an attorney to work with them
throughout the process and that there may be harmful repercussions on any
child born from their efforts.180
Determining who has access to ART, posthumous reproduction, and
PMSR based on marital status is not only outdated, but unnecessary in light
of the other options available. The recommended approaches could prove
more effective in balancing the delicate interests involved in these
175
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considerations. Additionally, implementing these recommendations would
require minimal effort, given the lack of existing regulation of posthumous
reproduction and PMSR in most of the United States.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has affirmatively established that the right to
procreate and the right to make procreative decisions belong to each
individual.181 Additionally, lower courts have produced a line of decisions
effectively extending constitutional protection of those rights to include the
right to use ART.182 If individuals have an affirmative right to make their own
procreative decisions, and couples have an affirmative right to privacy in
making those decisions as a unit, then a surviving partner should have the right
to continue a couple’s mutual procreative plan following the other partner’s
death, regardless of marital status. Individuals who seek to procreate using the
sperm of a deceased partner are exercising their constitutional right to make
procreative decisions. There is no reason this right should be limited when it
comes to the ability to choose with whom to conceive, provided that the
chosen gamete-provider’s consent is evident. The rights to use ART and to
make reproductive decisions were established to protect the personal freedom
to make and carry out an individual or couple’s procreative plans.183
Posthumous reproduction and PMSR, as features within the broader field of
ART, are becoming an important part of family planning for many partners
and spouses.184 It follows that there is a constitutional right to posthumously
reproduce for partners whose procreative plans have been disrupted, whether
they are married or unmarried.
The existing regulatory framework governing posthumous reproduction
and PMSR is wholly insufficient to grapple with the complex ethical and
legal questions involved. With a total absence of national regulation and
sparse state regulation, the courts may soon be forced to step up and address
these issues as the use of these technologies becomes increasingly
commonplace. For whoever develops the next phase of regulation, it is
essential that they eliminate classifications controlling who has access to
posthumous reproduction and PMSR that discriminate based on marital
status in language or in effect. In Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan made a point
to include the following quote from Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Railway Express Agency v. New York:

181
See supra Part III.B (describing the constitutional framework for evaluating regulation of
posthumous reproduction).
182
See supra Part I.A.2–3 (describing seminal American ART and posthumous reproduction cases).
183
See supra Part III.C (describing an affirmative right to non-discriminatory regulation of
posthumous reproduction and PMSR).
184
See supra Part I (describing how new forms of reproduction come into conflict with traditional
notions of parenting and family).
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The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected.185
While we may not see it now, and while unmarried individuals may be
in the minority of those pursuing posthumous reproduction, governmental
inaction in affirmatively establishing the right of unmarried persons to use
ART detracts from the right of all persons to use ART.

185
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (quoting Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949)).

